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Abstract Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (RUK) are major
players in the international grain markets and their exports
help to improve global grain availability and hence food
security. However, during the last decade the availability of
RUK grain exports was repeatedly diminished by harvest
failures and further reduced by the introduction of export
restrictions. By simulating a reoccurrence of the 2010 RUK
harvest situation this paper assesses the impact of grain har-
vest failures and subsequent temporary export restrictions
(bans, quotas, taxes) on national and international food secu-
rity, specifically quantifying the effects on agricultural market
prices and quantities. For the analysis AGLINK-COSIMO, a
recursive-dynamic, partial equilibrium, supply–demand mod-
el, has been employed. Simulation results highlight the im-
portance of RUK’s grain production for world markets and
global food security, indicating substantial price increases due
to limited grain exports fromRUK.Moreover, scenario results
illustrate that temporary RUK export restrictions can consid-
erably aggravate the situation on world grain markets, with
particularly adverse effects for grain net importing countries.
At the same time, results show that for a country like Ukraine,
i.e. a country usually exporting large shares of its total grain
production, the introduction of export restrictions could po-
tentially result in decreases of domestic consumer prices to a
level even below a situation with normal weather conditions.
The results put international trade policy into focus and un-
derline the necessity of greater cooperation on the part of
exporting countries in order to avoid importing countries
being denied necessary grain supplies.
Keywords Harvest failures . Export restrictions . Food
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Background
During the Soviet times, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan
(RUK) were main producers of wheat and coarse grains1 for
other Soviet republics. However, on aggregate, the USSR was
a grain importer rather than exporter. After the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991 the RUK countries began their transition
from centrally planned to market economies. This transition
comprised an overall restructuring of the agricultural sector
and the production of almost all agricultural commodities in
RUK went down dramatically. During the 2000s agricultural
output in RUK began to rebound, and the three countries
became big players in the international trade of agricultural
products, especially with regard to exports in the grain sector.
A major driver of the increase in production and exports was
the rise of large and dynamic, vertically-integrated farming
operations (big farm co-operatives)2 which are engaged in
more efficient agricultural and management practices and
1 Under the term coarse grains mainly maize and barley are considered,
but also oats, sorghum, rye, millet, triticale and other cereals.
2 The big farm co-operatives have little or nothing to do with the Soviet
time kolhoz & sovhos, as they have a completely different management
structure and property type.
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enjoy better credit access. Furthermore, the livestock sector in
RUK experienced a severe contraction during the 1990s,
which led to big decreases in domestic feed demand and hence
an increase in exportable grain surpluses (Liefert et al. 2010;
OECD-FAO 2011; Liefert et al. 2013).
By the end of the 2000s, RUK exports in wheat accounted
for about a fifth of total grain traded on the world market.
Russia is a major exporter of wheat, with a share of 13.1 % of
total world exports, followed by Ukraine (7.9 %) and Kazakh-
stan (5.1 %). Regarding coarse grains, Ukraine has a share of
9.9 % in total world exports, while Russia and Kazakhstan
have shares of 3.3 % and 0.3 % respectively (cf. Table 1).
According to the OECD-FAO (2012) agricultural outlook,
Russia alone is expected to surpass the USA as the world’s
largest wheat exporter over the next decade and RUK together
are expected to account for about 35 % of total world wheat
exports by 2021. For coarse grains projections indicate that
Russia will reduce significantly its exports as expected in-
creases in domestic animal production will require more feed.
Kazakhstan is currently not a major exporter of coarse grains
and this situation is not expected to change in the coming
years. In Ukraine, exports are projected to remain stable at the
high level of 17 million tonnes (Mt) (OECD-FAO 2012). The
dynamics of wheat and coarse grain exports from RUK coun-
tries are presented in Fig. 1, comprising both historical data
from 2000 to 2012 and projections until 2021.
The projected developments in RUK with regard to grain
production certainly could help to improve grain availability
on international markets and hence global food security.3
However, during the last decade the availability of grain
exports from the RUK countries was repeatedly diminished
by harvest failures due to severe droughts and then further
reduced by the introduction of export restriction policies. The
most recent examples of temporary export restrictions were in
the years 2007–2008 and 2010–2011: between July and Oc-
tober 2007, Ukraine introduced a total grain quota of only
12,000 tonnes (3,000 tonnes each for wheat, barley, rye and
corn), which virtually meant an export ban.4 In 2008, Russia
implemented an export tax of 40 % on wheat and Kazakhstan
applied an export ban from April to September 2008 (Dollive
2008; OECD 2013a). In 2010, both Russia and Kazakhstan
considered the introduction of bans on grain exports and,
while Kazakhstan finally refrained from export restrictions,
Russia implemented an export ban from August 2010 to June
2011. Ukraine opted for a grain export quota of 6.2 Mt in total
from October 2010 to July 20115 and then introduced export
taxes of 9 % for wheat, 12 % for maize and 14 % for barley
from July to December 2011 (OECD 2011; OECD 2013b).
It should be noted that Ukraine has been a member of the
WTO sinceMay 2008 and Russia since August 2012, whereas
Kazakhstan might also soon achieve WTO membership
(WTO 2012; WTO 2013). Under WTO commitments, mem-
bers are generally not allowed to ban exports completely.
However there are exceptions, and therefore even under
WTO rules countries can prohibit or restrict exports of agri-
cultural products if national food security is threatened, but
only temporarily and only if they comply with Article XI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
Article XII of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).
In general, export restrictions are introduced by a country
to reduce the flow of exports of a given good, which should
lead to increased volumes available of this product on the
domestic market and decreased domestic prices. With an
export ban, no exports of the respective product are allowed.
With an export quota, exports are quantitatively limited to the
amount of the quota. An export quota is only effective if it is
binding, i.e. if the export demand exceeds the quota amount.
Export taxes6 can be applied as a percentage of product value
(ad valorem tax) or as a fixed rate per physical unit of product
(specific tax). In theory all export restrictions have an equiv-
alent tax level, i.e. an export tax could be set at a level that
results in the same amount of exports as an export quota and in
an extreme case a prohibitive tax would have the same effect
as an export ban. Consequently, apart from possible adminis-
trative costs and government revenue (export taxes generate
revenues for the government), the effects of export restrictions
dependmore on the level of the restriction made rather than on
the instrument used to achieve this level, i.e. regarding exports
the kind of policy instrument generally only matters with
respect to the level of restriction it implements (Kazeki
2006; Mitra and Josling 2009; Sharma 2011).
Temporary export restricting policies are used when a
country’s production is lower than usual or/and when interna-
tional prices are rising. This was the case in the two periods
mentioned above, and RUK countries implemented measures
to restrict grain exports with the aim of keeping domestic
prices low for human consumption and animal feed. Interna-
tionally, the RUK governments justified the introduction of
export restrictions on the grounds of national food security
(Abbott 2009; Mitra and Josling 2009; WTO 2011). When a
country with usually large grain exports modifies its net
3 Food security is generally considered to comprise four pillars: availabil-
ity (whether enough food is available either through domestic production
or imports), access to food (physically and economically), utilization
(concerns regarding health and nutritional diet) and stability (whether a
state of food (in)security is transitory or permanent) (FAO, 1996; FAO,
2009; Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). In this paper we concentrate on the
pillars of food availability and the price aspect of access.
4 For wheat this was followed by an export quota of 200 000 tonnes from
January to March 2008. The quota was then further expanded to 1.2 Mt
and finally cancelled in May 2008 due to an expected exceptionally large
wheat harvest (FAPRI 2013).
5 The quota was lifted earlier (in May-June 2011) for wheat, maize and
barley.
6 A variety of similar or complementary terms are used for export taxes
such as export tariffs, export duties, export fees, export levies or export
charges (Kazeki 2006).
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supply (level of exports) to the worldmarkets, the quantity can
be sufficiently large to influence world prices. In general,
export restrictions implemented by a country will reduce
supply to the rest of the world, which in the case of a large
grain exporting country can imply a substantial fall in world
supply that results in an increase in international prices. While
in the short term the increased prices will benefit producers in
the rest of the world (by increasing their profits), consumer
welfare will decline as consumers have to pay a higher price
for food. As a response to higher prices, producers in the rest
of the world will increase their production, which in turn then
leads to a fall in prices from the short-run level. Given the
importance of RUK countries with regard to grain exports it is
assumed that the above mentioned export restrictions in RUK
had adverse effects on international food security by adding to
instability in world grain markets and contributing to spikes in
international food prices; however it is not clear to what extent
(Abbott 2009; Mitra and Josling 2009; Anderson and Nelgen
2011; Headey 2011; Sharma 2011).
In 2012, grain production in all three countries was once
more hit by severe droughts. Especially Russia and Ukraine
suffered bad wheat harvests, which led to speculation that both
countries would impose again some restrictions on wheat ex-
ports (Reuters 2012; 2013). Even though no effective restric-
tions were finally put into place, the recent events show that
harvest failures and respective ad hoc policy decisions in RUK
Table 1 Share (%) of wheat and
coarse grains exports in total
world trade (2008–2009 average)
Source: USDA, 2012
Country Crop 2008-2009 average
(1000 t)
Share in total
exports (%)
Russia Wheat 18,475 13.1
Coarse Grains 3,946 3.3
Ukraine Wheat 11,187 7.9
Coarse Grains 11,628 9.9
Kazakhstan Wheat 7,203 5.1
Coarse Grains 329 0.3
RUK Wheat 36,865 26.2
Coarse Grains 15,903 13.5
USA Wheat 25,783 18.3
Coarse Grains 52,802 44.7
EU Wheat 23,733 16.8
Coarse Grains 4,271 3.6
Canada Wheat 18,959 13.5
Coarse Grains 3,483 3.0
Australia Wheat 14,787 10.5
Coarse Grains 4,420 3.7
Argentina Wheat 5,947 4.2
Coarse Grains 15,609 13.2
Total World Wheat 140,875 100
Coarse Grains 118,036 100
Wheat exports Coarse grains exports 
Fig. 1 Historical and projected wheat and coarse grains exports in RUK
(in 1000 t). Source: OECD-FAO (2012), data for 2012 corrected
according to USDA (USDA 2012a, 2012b). Data extracted with DataM
(cf. Hélaine et al. 2013).
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might occur again and threaten global grain availability and
food security. Against this background the purpose of this paper
is to quantitatively assess the impact of harvest failures and
subsequent trade restricting measures temporarily introduced in
the RUK countries. Specifically we aim to address the follow-
ing questions: What would be the impact of a reoccurrence of a
similar RUK harvest situation as in 2010 on global grain
markets and food security? How do different temporary export
restrictions implemented in RUK affect quantities and prices on
both the domestic and world markets? How do the impacts vary
between net exporting and net importing countries?
To answer these questions we use the AGLINK-COSIMO
model. In a benchmark scenario we simulated harvest failures
in the cereal sector of RUK and, in three policy scenarios, we
separately simulated the implementation of export bans, ex-
port quotas and export taxes in RUK. In all scenarios we
assessed the respective impacts on food security by quantify-
ing the effects on agricultural grain availability and prices.
With respect to prices we analysed the effects on world prices
as well as domestic producer and consumer prices in the RUK
countries. Furthermore, in the examples of the European
Union (EU) and Egypt, we analysed how the simulated har-
vest failures and export restrictions in RUK affect net
exporting countries and net importing countries, respectively.
Specification of the modelling approach and the scenarios
The AGLINK-COSIMO model
For the quantitative analysis, AGLINK-COSIMO, a global
recursive-dynamic, partial equilibrium, supply–demand mod-
el, was adjusted and employed. The model was developed by
the OECD Secretariat7 and the FAO to conduct policy analysis
and prepare medium-term agricultural market outlooks in a
consistent analysis framework.
AGLINK-COSIMO endogenously calculates annual sup-
ply, demand, trade and prices for the main agricultural com-
modities produced, consumed and traded in each of the coun-
tries represented in the model. The overall design of the model
focuses in particular on the potential influence of agricultural
and trade policies on agricultural markets in the medium-term.
The projection period is 10 years and an outlook exercise for
the development of agricultural markets and prices is provided
annually in a joint publication of the OECD and the FAO. The
final product of the outlook exercise reflects the evolution of
the markets assuming a current policy framework, normal
weather conditions, given and expected yield growth rates
and exogenous assumptions on macroeconomic variables
such as GDP growth, exchange rates, world oil prices and
population growth (OECD 2007; OECD-FAO 2012). In the
context of market analysis it has to be highlighted that
AGLINK-COSIMO is based on several major assumptions
(OECD 2007): (i) World markets are assumed to be compet-
itive; neither buyers nor sellers behave as if they have market
power and market prices are determined via global or regional
equilibria in supply and demand; (ii) AGLINK-COSIMO is
not a spatial model and hence importers do not distinguish the
origin of commodities (i.e. transportation costs are not includ-
ed); (iii) AGLINK-COSIMO is a partial equilibrium model
focused on agricultural commodities (i.e. non-agricultural
markets are treated exogenously to the model).
AsAGLINK-COSIMOcoversmany global agricultural com-
modity markets and also many individual countries, the scope of
the model allows the estimation of agricultural and trade policy
impacts at the global and national levels. The country and
regional modules in AGLINK-COSIMO are all developed by
the OECD and FAO Secretariats in collaboration with country
and commodity market experts. Country specific information on
agricultural, biofuel and trade policies is updated annually and
thus allows the analysis of agricultural market developments in a
setting that reflects an up-to date policy framework (OECD
2007; OECD-FAO 2012). Price elasticities of demand and sup-
ply are kept constant over the projection period but are revised
regularly by the OECD and FAO secretariats. However, the
model does not explicitly incorporate risk aversion or specific
strategic behavior of the economic agents (such as producers,
consumers and stock agents) that may arise in the context of
volatile commodity markets. A further limitation of the model is
that it does not take into account ad-hoc changes in policy
mechanisms or goals that may occur, for example, under volatile
market situations in the medium-run. We partly tackle this latter
limitation by quantifying the effects of both major harvest fail-
ures and subsequent temporary export restrictions in RUK.
Scenarios description
For the purpose of this paper five simulation scenarios have
been constructed. The starting point for the simulations was
the data of the agricultural outlook of the OECD-FAO (2011)
and the European outlook for agricultural markets (DG AGRI
2010; Nii-Naate 2011). However, the data on export and
import tariffs in the AGLINK-COSIMO database needed to
be updated according to the latest available information on
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. All scenarios assume the
same underlying macroeconomic development for the period
2011–2021 (cf. DG AGRI 2010; OECD-FAO 2011), but they
partially differ with regard to the assumed weather conditions
and applied trade measures in RUK (Table 2).
The Baseline Scenario provides ‘standard’ projections for
the development of agricultural commodity markets until
7 The results of any analysis based on the use of the AGLINK-COSIMO
model by parties outside the OECD are outside the responsibility of the
OECDSecretariat. Conclusions derived by third-party users of AGLINK-
COSIMO should not be attributed to the OECD or its member
governments.
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2021, based on a coherent set of assumptions on exogenous
macroeconomic developments and under the assumption of
normal weather conditions and steady demand and yield
trends that follow recent time paths. The baseline assumes
continuation of existing policy measures over the projection
period, i.e. the RUK countries will not apply any temporary
export restrictions (cf. DG AGRI 2010; OECD-FAO 2011).
The Benchmark Scenario follows the general assumptions
of the Baseline Scenario; however it is assumed that in 2015
the RUK countries suffer severe reductions in grain produc-
tion due to unfavorable weather conditions. As/ orientation for
the production decrease we mimic the real harvest situation in
RUK as occurred in the year 2010, i.e. in the reference
scenario RUK wheat and coarse grains production in 2015 is
set at the level of the year 2010. This scenario represents the
benchmark for the three export restriction policy scenarios.
The three policy scenarios follow the assumptions of the
benchmark scenario, but simulate separately the temporary in-
troduction of export bans, quotas and taxes in RUK as a reaction
to the production decline in 2015. As mentioned above, these
trade restricting instruments have been employed in the RUK
countries in recent years, though their use varied in the countries
with regard to the year, duration and level of application. In our
simulation scenarios each of the instruments is applied for the
time of the entire (production) year 2015 and for illustrative
reasons we translate the levels of application as occurred in
Ukraine to the situation in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Scenario 1 simulates a situation where the three RUK
countries introduce complete export bans on wheat and coarse
grains for the year 2015.
Scenario 2 simulates a situation where all three countries
introduce export quotas in 2015. The size of the export quota
was calculated as a share of the production in each of the
countries. As reference point for this share we used the actual
export quota applied in Ukraine in 2010, when Ukraine intro-
duced export quotas of 1.0 Mt for wheat and 5.2 Mt for coarse
grains (OECD 2011).8 The export quotas simulated for Russia
and Kazakhstan represent the same share of production in the
respective countries.9 The derived export quotas for Russia are
1.39 Mt and 0.21 Mt for wheat and coarse grains
respectively10 and for Kazakhstan 0.9 Mt and 0.18 Mt.
Scenario 3 assumes that all three countries introduce the
same export taxes in 2015, 9 % for wheat and 13 % for coarse
grains on an ad valorem basis. These taxes correspond to the
tax levels implemented by Ukraine in 2011. Thus, in this
scenario, we assumed that the three countries have good
market information on prices and availability of wheat and
coarse grains and it is known a priori that the level of export
duties is enough to keep domestic prices low. It has to be
mentioned that in reality it is very unlikely that different
countries use exactly the same export duties unless they
belong to a Custom Union as for example Russia, Belorussia
and Kazakhstan. Thus it could indeed be the case for Russia
and Kazakhstan but rather not for Ukraine. However for this
scenario we used this simplification for didactic reasons as it
allows a better interpretation of scenario results.
For the technical implementation of the export restrictions
into the model we used different levels of export duties to
model export bans, quotas and taxes. This way of modelling
export restrictions is a well established technique in economic
modelling and follows a common way of modelling agricul-
tural trade policy (see e.g. Alston and James 2002; Korinek
et al. 2008). However, it has to be stressed that the modelling
results depend on the level of the restriction made and actually
not on the instrument used to achieve this level, as the kind of
policy instrument only matters with regard to the level of
restriction it implements. Thus, the aim of the paper is not to
show that there is a difference between the three policy instru-
ments as such regarding RUK exports, prices, consumption
etc., but rather that the level of restriction matters.
Table 2 Scenario overview
Scenario Name Scenario assumptions regarding weather conditions and temporary grain export restrictions in RUK countries in 2015
Baseline scenario No temporary export restrictions are introduced Normal weather conditions
Benchmark scenario No temporary export restrictions are introduced Production decline in 2015 due to severe droughts in RUK
Scenario 1 Export bans in RUK
Scenario 2 Export quotas in RUK
Scenario 3 Export taxes on ad valorem basis in RUK
8 In 2010, export quotas were in place in Ukraine from October 2010 to
May-June 2011 (i.e. 8–9 effective months); however in our simulation
exercise we assumed that quotas were effective throughout the year 2015
(i.e. from July 2015 to June 2016).
9 A ‘rational’ export quota should be related to the size of production,
stocks and domestic demand. RUK stock-to-use ratios in 2010, as indi-
cated in both the OECD-FAO and USDA databases for the three coun-
tries, have been in a similar range as they are in our baseline projections
for the year 2015. Therefore it is a rather good estimate to calculate the
size of the modelled export quotas as a share of the production in each of
the countries. To further level out differences in production and also
stock-to-use ratios we used the average of the production during the
period 2009–2011 in each country.
10 Due to the decreasing trend in the projection for Russian coarse grains
production we used the years 2010 and 2011 as an historical average.
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Scenario results
To depict the impact of the drought in RUK, results of the
reference scenario (drought in RUK) are compared to the
baseline (normal weather conditions), whereas the policy
scenarios (temporary export restrictions in RUK) are com-
pared to the benchmark scenario in order to show the addi-
tional market and price impacts of the policies implemented.
The final projection year in the scenario simulations is 2021.
However, here we present only the scenario results for the year
2015, i.e. the year of the modelled harvest shock and the
implementation of temporary export restrictions in RUK. We
concentrate on the year 2015 because the scenario results
indicate that the short-term effects are the most critical ones
in terms of global food security. In the short-term, farmers
have only limited possibilities for adapting their production
behaviour to the new market conditions (as most of the plant-
ing decisions have already been taken). The further scenario
results show that in 2016 farmers reacted to changed (world)
market conditions, and world grain markets started to regain
their pre-shock baseline levels.
Benchmark scenario
Simulation results of the benchmark scenario show that a
reoccurrence of the 2010 RUK harvest situation in 2015
would cause a total decrease in production in RUK of 29 %
for wheat and 34 % for coarse grains compared to the baseline
(i.e. under normal weather conditions) (Table 3). For wheat,
the production decrease in RUK implies a decline in world
production of 4 %, which leads to a 23 % increase in world
market prices. Due to the higher world prices, certain coun-
tries such as the USA and the EU increase their exports.11
However, increases of exports in third countries are rather
limited, because planting decisions of farmers have already
been taken before the drought event in RUK. Therefore an
export increase by third countries is only possible with a
switch from domestic use to exports or with stock releases.
A switch in domestic use can occur due to the substitution of
wheat by other feedstock, but this is also rather limited as
wheat demand for food consumption is quite inelastic, and
scenario results indicate that substitution takes place mainly in
the feed sector and only marginally in the biofuels sector. The
higher world market prices for wheat are transmitted to con-
sumers through higher consumer prices for bread and other
foods containing wheat, which provokes a decrease in global
wheat consumption of 2 %. With regard to the RUK domestic
markets, aggregated consumption decreases by 7 % and ex-
ports by almost 70 % compared to the baseline. Lower supply
leads to higher producer prices. However, in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, the price increase does not compensate for the
loss in quantity produced, resulting in decreases in production
value12 by 5 % and 20 %, respectively. By contrast, in Russia,
where the highest producer price increases are projected, the
production value increases by 10 %. Consumers are penalised
by the increase in food prices in all three countries, being least
affected in Russia and moderately affected in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan.
For coarse grains the simulated drought in RUK has less
effects on the world market than for wheat, which is attribut-
able to the lower share (10 %) of RUK exports in the world
market. However, even though world coarse grain production
and consumption decrease each by only 1 % in comparison to
the baseline, the effect on the world price is substantial, as it
increases by 15 %. This price increase triggers an increase in
coarse grain exports of third countries (especially USA, Brazil
and EU) by almost 10 %.
Export restriction scenarios: Impact on world food prices
Not surprisingly, scenario results show that the world market
prices for wheat and coarse grains would increase more with
RUK export restrictions than if the market were free to adjust
to the lower grain availability caused by the drought in RUK.
However, the effect on world market prices varies significant-
ly in the policy scenarios, depending on the level of restriction
adopted (cf. Fig. 2).
Wheat
In Scenario 1, when all three countries introduce export bans,
world trade in wheat decreases by 6 % compared to the
benchmark scenario. Due to RUK’s high share in world
exports this provokes an increase in the world price of wheat
of 11 %. In Scenario 2, where the RUK countries restrict their
wheat exports to a total quota of 3.3 Mt, total exports decrease
by 4 %. The impact on the world market price is lower than in
Scenario 1, but it still increase by 7 %. Contrary to an export
ban or tight export quotas, the introduction of a 9 % export
tariff on wheat in Scenario 3 allows the RUK countries to
continue exporting significant amounts, which results in ex-
ports of more than 9 Mt. Therefore total RUK exports de-
crease by only 1 % and the world price increase by 1 %.
Coarse grains
For coarse grains, only the export restriction measures intro-
duced in Ukraine are projected to have a noticeable impact
compared to the benchmark scenario, as the other two coun-
tries are major producers but do not export such significant
11 This could also be observed in 2010, when e.g. the USA exported 35
Mt of wheat in comparison to 26 Mt on average in 2008 and 2009. 12 Calculated as the quantity produced times the producer price.
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quantities. Moreover, the share of RUK in the world coarse
grains market is lower than the total share of RUK in the
wheat world market. Therefore the effects of the export mea-
sures on world market prices for coarse grains are similar to
those for wheat but at a lower level. The increase in world
coarse grains prices varies between 6 % in Scenario 1 and less
than 1 % in Scenario 3. The increase in world prices induces
major coarse grains producers, such as the USA and the EU, to
further increase their exports (up to 3 % in Scenario 1) com-
pared to the benchmark scenario. This export increase in third
countries is possible because coarse grains can be substituted
by other feedstock to feed animals or to produce biofuels.
Export restriction scenarios: Domestic impacts in RUK
Wheat
In the benchmark scenario Russian wheat production was set
at 43.5Mt (as experienced in 2010), implying that the drought
caused a 27 % decrease in Russian wheat production com-
pared to the baseline (Table 3). With the introduction of the
export ban in Scenario 1, Russian exports drop to 0, whereas
the 1.39 Mt export quota restriction in Scenario 2 results in a
28 % decrease of exports in comparison to the benchmark
scenario. The 9 % export tax in Scenario 3 is more restrictive
than the quota and implies a 39 % decrease in Russian exports
(Fig. 3). Russian producer prices are only slightly affected by
the introduction of the different export restrictions. The drop
in exports is already drastic in the benchmark scenario (al-
most −90 %), considering that the simulated decrease in
production (−15.9 Mt) is relatively close to the quantity
exported in the baseline scenario (13.7 Mt). Compared to the
benchmark, the decrease in Russian producer prices for wheat
varies between no change with an export quota to decreases of
6 % and 3 % with an export ban and export tax, respectively.
Domestic consumption increases by 4 % with an export ban
and by 2 % with the export tax, whereas consumption remains
stable with the modelled export quota.
In Ukraine and Kazakhstan the situation is very different
from the situation in Russia, as in the baseline, i.e. under
normal weather conditions, the two countries are projected
to export almost 50 % of their wheat production in 2015
(whereas Russia exports about 23 % of its production). With
the drought in the benchmark scenario, wheat production
decreases by 27 % in Ukraine and 41 % in Kazakhstan,
resulting in production of 17Mt, and 10Mt respectively. Thus
the simulated production loss is lower than the countries’
export levels in the baseline scenario (Table 3) and therefore
Ukraine and Kazakhstan continue exporting significant quan-
tities of wheat (6 Mt and 3 Mt respectively) in the benchmark
scenario. Under these circumstances the introduction of an
export ban or a very restrictive quota has considerable impacts
on producer prices. As such policies imply that huge quanti-
ties of wheat would be released on the domestic market, they
Table 3 Impact of the simulated drought on the world and RUK grain markets (2015)
Baseline Benchmark Scenario (Drought) vs. Baseline
Prod. Exports Cons. Prod. price Prod. Exports Cons. Prod. price
(Million tonnes) (USD/t) (%)
Wheat Ukraine 24 11 13 233 −27 −45 −5 30
Russia 59 14 46 115 −27 −86 −8 50
Kazakhstan 17 8 9 103 −41 −67 −5 36
RUK 100 33 68 na −29 −68 −7 na
World 692 133 694 237 −4 −11 −2 23
Coarse grains Ukraine 26 12 14 193 −16 −29 −2 19
Russia 30 0 33 144 −50 −83 −4 37
Kazakhstan 3 0 2 115 −30 −99 −12 71
RUK 59 13 49 na −34 −32 −4 na
World 1,202 130 1,200 196 −1 6 −1 15
Note: ‘na’=not applicable, Prod. = Production, Cons. =Consumption, Prod. price =Producer price
Fig. 2 Changes in world prices due to RUK export restrictions (%-
changes compared to the benchmark scenario in 2015)
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put downward pressure on domestic prices. Consequently,
Ukrainian producer prices are projected to be 61 % (Scenario
1) and 55 % (Scenarios 2) below the prices in the benchmark
scenario. This implies that in Ukraine the producer prices
could be even below the baseline level, which would be
remarkable because production declines due to drought would
usually imply an increase in prices rather than a decrease.
Introducing an export ban or a restrictive export quota would
therefore also potentially result in lower consumer prices than
in the situation without a drought, leading to consumption
increases of 19 % and 17 %, respectively. By contrast, the
introduction of a 9 % export tax on Ukrainian wheat in
Scenario 3 is much less market disruptive. Compared to the
benchmark, Ukrainian exports decrease by only 6 % and
producer prices by 7 %, whereas domestic consumption re-
mains stable. Nonetheless, Ukrainian wheat producers still
loose 12 % of production value compared to the baseline,
whereas without any export restrictions the loss would be 7 %
due to the drought (Fig. 4).
In Kazakhstan the impact of the export restriction measures
is similar to the impacts in Ukraine, but the magnitude is
different because in Kazakhstan the level of quantity exported
in the baseline is closer to the simulated production loss due to
the drought. Consequently, when exports are banned, the
additional quantity released on the domestic market put slight-
ly less pressure on domestic market prices. Nevertheless, in
Scenario 1, producer prices in Kazakhstan decrease by 32 %
and consumer prices by 10%, whereas consumption increases
by 11 % compared to the benchmark scenario. With an export
quota set at 0.9 Mt in Scenario 2, exports decrease by 66 %,
producer and consumer prices decrease by 24 % and 7 %
respectively, and consumption increases by 8 %. By contrast,
the introduction of a 9 % export tax on wheat in Scenario 3 is
not very restrictive, with exports decreasing by 10 %, produc-
er prices by 6 %, consumer prices by 2 % and domestic
consumption increasing by 2 %. Thus, the simulated policy
objective of maintaining stability of domestic consumer prices
in Kazakhstan is reached with both the export ban and the
export quota. However, with the modelled export quota, Ka-
zakh producers are better off than with the export ban, as it
allows for a small price increase (+3 %) in comparison to the
baseline, whereas with an export ban, producer prices are
below the baseline level (−7 %). The tax level of 9 % used
in Scenario 3 are not enough to keep consumer prices at the
same level as in the baseline, as they increase by 7 %, which is
2 percentage points less than in the benchmark scenario.
Coarse grains
The OECD-FAO (2012) agricultural outlook projects an in-
crease in livestock production in Russia over the coming years
and therefore the domestic consumption of coarse grains is
expected to increase in order to feed the livestock. This devel-
opment implies reduced levels of exports of Russian coarse
grains in the simulated year 2015. In this context, the introduc-
tion of export restrictions on Russian coarse grains is less
relevant because the quantitative restrictions are not binding
and therefore do not further affect producer prices. Moreover,
as a reaction to the drought and in order to be able to feed its
livestock, Russian coarse grain imports in all policy scenarios
are five times greater than in the baseline. Kazakhstan is not a
major producer or consumer of coarse grains and therefore
coarse grains scenario results are not further commented for
this country. By contrast, Ukraine is amajor player on theworld
market for coarse grains. As a consequence of the drought, a
drop in coarse grains production of 4 Mt is simulated. Simula-
tion results of Scenario 1 show that, with an export ban, almost
9 Mt of coarse grains are additionally kept on the domestic
market. As a consequence, and despite the increase in world
prices, Ukrainian producer prices would be 66% and consumer
prices 26 % below the prices in the benchmark scenario. With
the implementation of a 5.2 Mt export quota in Scenario 2, the
producer price decrease in Ukraine is less than with an export
ban, but is still very significant (−47 %) as this export quota
implies a reduction of 40 % of the exports in comparison to the
benchmark scenario. Accordingly, Ukrainian consumer prices
Fig. 3 Changes in RUK export levels and producer prices due to the export restrictions (%-change compared to the benchmark scenario in 2015)
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are 16 % lower than in the benchmark scenario and
domestic consumption increases by 15 %. In Scenario 3
the export tax of 13 % implies a limited reduction of
exports (−9 %) compared to the benchmark scenario
and a slight increase (+3 %) in domestic consumption.
Consumer price levels are maintained, i.e. they are
lower than in the benchmark scenario and actually equal
to the baseline level. Ukrainian coarse grain producers
still benefit from a small price increase (+5 %), but
with regard to farm income this price increase would
not be enough to compensate for the production loss
caused by the drought.
Impacts on a major grain exporting consortium: the EU
The EU is a major exporter of grains on the world market.
Between 2008 and 2011 the EU exported a yearly average of
21 Mt of wheat and more than 8 Mt of coarse grains (two-
thirds of it being barley and one-third maize). At the same time
the EU also imported 6 Mt of wheat and 5.5 Mt of coarse
grains (mainly maize) per year.
Benchmark scenario: impact of the RUK drought
The increase of the world price due to the lower grain
harvest in RUK is partially transmitted to the EU market
where producer prices increase by 21 % for wheat and
7 % for coarse grains. As in RUK, European farmers are
not able to adapt their production in the short-term and
supply remains stable. However, the significant increase
in world wheat prices (+23 %) triggers more EU exports
(+8 %) and causes a decrease in EU stocks (−5 %). At the
same time imports are reduced by 7 % as they become too
costly. The lower availability on the domestic market
translates into a reduction of the use of wheat by 1 %,
in particular for ethanol production (−5 %) and for food
(−1 %), while EU consumer prices potentially increase by
8 %.13 For coarse grains,14 the picture is more complex as
both exports and imports increase considerably by 22 %
and 28 %, respectively, while total use only slightly
increased (+0.4 %). The EU producer price of coarse
grains increases less than the world market price, imply-
ing a gain in relative competition of the EU, which boosts
EU exports. On the domestic market the price increase of
barley (+8 %) is higher than for maize (+6 %). Therefore
the domestic use of barley (mainly for feed) decreases and
barley is substituted in animal diets by maize. This de-
mand for feed drives the significant increase of maize
imports (+30 %).
Export restriction scenarios
The introduction of export restriction measures in RUK am-
plifies the drought effects (Fig. 5). In the scenario with a full
ban on RUK exports (Scenario 1) EU wheat producer prices
increase by 10 % (reaching 307 USD/t) compared to the
benchmark. In Scenario 2 the price increase is slightly lower
at 7 %. The modelled export taxes (Scenario 3) have a minor
impact and EU producer prices increase by only 1 %. Further
effects in the policy scenarios are that EU exports of wheat are
higher, domestic consumer prices increase more and the total
consumption decrease further compared to the benchmark sce-
nario. The effects for EU coarse grains are quite similar but at a
lower magnitude, with the EU producer price increase varying
between +5% in the case of a full ban on RUK exports and 0%
with export taxes. In the case of an export ban, the high world
price causes EUmaize imports to diminish by 6% compared to
the benchmark, whereas the import decrease is less in the other
Consumer prices Consumption
Fig. 4 Changes in RUK consumer prices and consumption due to the export restrictions (%-change compared to the benchmark scenario in 2015)
13 In the EU the transmission of the producer price increase to the
consumer price may seem rather high in comparison to the other countries
presented in this article. However, this is because the food product used as
reference in the model for the EU (wheat flour) is not as processed as the
respective reference (bread) in other countries.
14 In the European module of the AGLINK-COSIMO model detailed
information on barley and maize is available.
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scenarios. In general, results indicate that for a net exporting
region such as the EU, except for producer prices, the effects of
the simulated bans and/or export quotas in RUK are rather
small and equivalent between the different policy measures.
Moreover, the simulated temporary export taxes in RUK have
almost no effect on EU markets.
Impacts on a major grain importing country: Egypt
Egypt is the largest wheat importer in the world, with yearly
imports of around 10Mt. This implies that Egypt is importing
about half of its domestic wheat requirement, almost 90 % of
which is used for human consumption. In addition, Egypt
imports between 5 and 6 Mt of coarse grains per year (almost
all maize, mostly used for animal feed). Given the dependency
of the country on imports, the government aims to keep
strategic wheat stocks of about five months of the countries’
consumption level. Wheat is considered as a major component
in the Egyptian diet, with Egypt having one of the highest
wheat per capita consumption levels in the world. For food
security reasons, Egypt operates a food subsidy system, which
comprises a specific bread subsidy programme available to
every citizen (about 85 % of the bread produced in Egypt is
either fully or semi-subsidized). To keep the price for the
typical Egyptian ‘baladi’ bread at a low level, wheat is given
to mills at a low price, with Egypt’s General Authority for
Supply Commodities (GASC) covering the difference from
the purchased wheat price. This policy of food subsidy has
considerable impact on the public budget and becomes even
more burdensome for the Egyptian government the higher the
wheat prices are (World Bank 2010; Trego 2011; Abis 2012;
USDA FAS 2012).
Benchmark scenario: impact of the RUK drought
The world wheat price increase of 23 %, due to the RUK
drought, is almost entirely transmitted to the producer price in
Egypt, which increases by 21 %. Imports become very expen-
sive and decrease by 16 % (−1.8 Mt). As a consequence, huge
quantities of stocks are released (1.3 Mt). The consumer price
is projected to increase by 5 %. This increase may seem rather
small, but this is because, for Egypt, the reference for wheat
consumer prices in the model is bread, i.e. a product with a
high degree of processing compared to the raw product.
Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the price increase is
measured as a yearly average and hence does not reflect the
intra-year price changes, which can be very important. For
coarse grains, the world price increase leads to a 14 % rise in
Egyptian producer prices, imports decrease by 8 %, whereas
stock releases increase by 14 %.
Export restriction scenarios
The simulated introduction of export restrictions in
RUK has a major impact on the Egyptian market, con-
siderably amplifying the effects of the drought (Fig. 6).
In Scenarios 1 and 2, Egypt’s wheat producer prices rise
further compared to the benchmark scenario, by 10 %
and 6 %, respectively. Due to the increased global
prices, wheat imports further decrease by 9 % in Sce-
nario 1 and 6 % in Scenario 2. In order to allow
maintenance of the food use of wheat, additional stocks
are released on the market (10 % in Scenario 1 and 7 %
in Scenario 2). Nonetheless consumer prices for wheat
(bread) rise further compared to the benchmark scenario
(3 % in Scenario 1 and 2 % in Scenario 2). By contrast,
the modelled level of export taxes in Scenario 3 has
only marginal effects on the Egyptian wheat market. For
coarse grains, scenario results indicate similar effects to
those for wheat, however, at a lower magnitude. It has
to be kept in mind that in Egypt most of the coarse
grains are used to feed animals, therefore consumers
may not be immediately affected by the price increases.
However, livestock producers are badly hit by increased
Wheat Coarse grains
Fig. 5 Changes in EU wheat and coarse grains markets due to RUK export restrictions (%-change compared to the benchmark scenario in 2015)
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feed cost and thus consumers might be affected with a
few months delay by a rise in meat prices.
Discussion of results
The scenario results underline the importance of RUK’s grain
production for world grain markets and international food
security, indicating substantial price increases for wheat
and coarse grains due to both the simulated drought and
subsequent temporary RUK export restrictions. Related to
the modelled prices, several issues have to be highlighted.
The AGLINK-COSIMO model uses yearly price averages
and monthly fluctuations are not reflected. This can have
significant implications on food security as monthly price
spikes may be much higher than those measured in our
analysis, concentrating on average yearly effects. In this
context it also has to be noted that, during a period of low
grain availability, private stock agents may be tempted to
keep the grain in stocks and wait for even higher prices
before selling, thus putting additional pressure on the
market and causing further price increases. Such strategic
behaviour of stock agents is not taken into account in the
model, but may very well take place also in RUK,
decreasing the dampening effect of the export restric-
tions on domestic prices and consequently leading to
higher domestic price increases in RUK during some
months than those projected in our scenarios. Thus, in
the presence of strategic behaviour of stock agents or
intermediaries such as millers and bakeries, our scenario
results might rather overestimate the indicated domestic
price decreases in RUK. Nonetheless, the results clearly
show the decrease in price transmission between world
and domestic grain prices due to the RUK trade restric-
tions. In this respect our results support findings of
other studies on price-insulating trade policies (e.g.
Myers and Jayne 2011; Götz et al. 2013a and Götz
et al. 2013b). Although an actual price decrease in
domestic producer prices could not be observed by Götz
et al. (2013b), their findings indicate that, due to export
restrictions in 2008, domestic wheat prices in Ukraine
were about 30 % below the world market price. The
USDA (2011) also reported that the export restrictions
in Ukraine resulted in a slower growth rate of domestic
feed and milling wheat prices in the first half of the
marketing year 2010/2011, with the difference between
domestic and world market price of milling wheat
reaching in some cases over 100 USD/t.
With regard to consumer prices, it has to be noted that
the entire impact on food prices cannot be assessed as
consumer prices in the model relate to specific commod-
ities and do not cover the whole panel of commodities
using wheat or coarse grains as feedstock. In addition, the
product used as reference for consumer prices in the
model is not the same in all countries and, in particular,
the degree of processing can be unequal (for wheat e.g. it
can be flour or bread). The more a product is processed
the less the developments in producer prices are transmit-
ted to consumer prices. Although AGLINK-COSIMO has
its limitations with respect to the representation of
consumer prices and their direct comparability among
different countries, consumer prices as provided by the
model give a good indication of the potential magnitude
of consumer price changes. Empirical findings of Welton
(2011) for example also showed that the export ban in
Russia in 2010–2011 did not help much in reducing
domestic food prices. On the other hand, studies on
Ukraine’s wheat export restrictions in 2007–2008 and
2010–2011 indicate that Ukrainian intermediaries along
the wheat-to-bread supply chain exhibited market power
and did not really pass on the price decrease to the
Ukrainian end consumers (Grueninger and von Cramon-
Taubadel 2008; FAPRI 2013; Götz et al. 2013a).
Wheat Coarse grains
Fig. 6 Changes in Egyptian wheat and coarse grains markets due to RUK export restrictions (%-change compared to the benchmark scenario in 2015)
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In the analysis we only focus on the short-run effects (one
year), during which supply is inelastic as farmers cannot alter
their production decisions. At the global level, farmers will
respond to increased prices by increasing production of the
relevant crops in the following season. However, in export
restricting countries, the domestic market interventions can
have adverse effects on the production portfolio and incen-
tives in the following years. In Russia and Ukraine, a growing
switch from wheat and barley to maize and oilseeds produc-
tion can be observed, which is assumed to be partially attrib-
utable to the circumstance that the latter crops experienced
none or, at least, less government intervention during the
previous few years (Kobuta et al. 2012; van Leeuwen et al.
2012; Salputra et al. 2013). Furthermore, export restrictions
impede the development of RUK future markets with forward
contracts (as their fulfilment cannot be guaranteed), which has
adverse effects on financing possibilities in the agricultural
sector (see e.g. Zorya 2006; World Bank 2008; OECD 2012).
Moreover, temporary export restrictions act as a disincentive
for domestic producers with regard to input use (fertilizer and
plant protection) and investments. This observation is, for
example, supported by the analysis of Götz et al. (2013a),
who found empirical evidence indicating negative long-run
domestic market effects in the case of Ukraine’s export re-
strictions in 2007–2008, especially by reducing incentives for
farmers and traders to invest. When producers hold back
necessary investments and also use less fertilizers and plant
protection because they are uncertain if they will be able to
benefit from higher world prices, the implications are at least
twofold. First, it implies that, without the fear of temporary
export restrictions, RUK producers might increase production,
which would have positive effects on global grain availability.
Second, it makes grain production in RUKmore vulnerable to
weather conditions, which partially explains the high volatility
in RUK’s grain production over the last few years and, as
demonstrated in our paper, has adverse effects on both do-
mestic and global grain markets. Thus, apart from negative
effects for global grain markets, temporary export restrictions
in RUK bear also various negative domestic effects and it can
be expected that the countries could benefit in the mid- and
long-term from renouncing the use of temporary export re-
strictions and creating a more reliable policy environment for
domestic producers and private investors.
Regarding the impact on net importing countries, the exam-
ple of Egypt shows that limited RUK grain exports may have
major impacts on the countries’ food security. Moreover, the
increased consumer prices for bread due to RUK harvest fail-
ures and even more so due to wheat export bans or restrictive
quotas imply that the cost for the Egyptian government of
subsidizing bread would increase remarkably. In this context
it should bementioned that in the specific case of Egypt, several
authors highlight flaws of the Egyptian bread subsidy pro-
gramme, which become particularly obvious in times of high
wheat prices. Egypt’s food subsidy system is widely considered
as costly, inefficient and not well targeted (World Bank 2010;
Trego 2011; Abis 2012; USDA FAS 2012; Breisinger et al.
2013). Interruptions on the world grain markets are likely to
occur again and the scenario results on the effects of RUK
droughts and export restrictions indicate that this can become
quite burdensome for Egypt. Hence our simulation results
support findings of the World Bank (2010), which highlight
the need to reform Egypt’s food subsidy system, especially
reducing costs by better targeting towards the poor population.
It has to be kept in mind that drought and import restric-
tions in RUK may only be one source affecting world grain
markets. There might be other events, for example droughts or
exceptionally good harvests in other countries that may wors-
en or compensate for the situation in RUK. Furthermore,
causalities can become quite complex, as price increases due
to negative supply shocks and subsequent export restrictions
can cause importing countries to lower import tariffs (Headey
2011; Yu et al. 2011; Bouët and Laborde Debucquet 2012;
Martin and Anderson 2012; Rutten et al. 2013). For example,
of 81 countries surveyed during the food price crises in 2007–
2008, 25 economies increased export restrictions while 43
economies reduced import tariffs (Demeke et al. 2009). This
demonstrates that there are usually several events that influ-
ence world market prices and it can become rather difficult to
separate the various effects. By separating the effects of RUK
harvest failures and temporary export restrictions our analysis
helps to improve the understanding on how quantitatively
important supply shocks in major exporting countries are
reflected in global grain availability and food security.
Regarding the impact of the different export restriction
levels modelled, our scenario results indicate that, compared
to the export bans and restrictive export quotas analysed, the
modelled export taxes in RUK would be preferable from an
international perspective. Moreover, and even though this
issue is not covered within the AGLINK-COSIMO model,
major exporting countries are considered to be generally better
off by implementing export taxes because such taxes raise
government revenues (Mitra and Josling 2009; Rutten et al.
2013). In the context of food security the revenue raised by the
export tax could, for example, be redistributed to poorer
households in order to mitigate more directly the slightly
higher increases in domestic RUK consumer prices indicated
in the results of the export tax scenario. However, this does not
mean that the scenario results should be used generally to
advocate the implementation of export taxes; it just implies
that, in the modelled situation, the level of restriction imposed
in the export tax scenario would have less distorting effects on
the world markets than export bans or tight quotas, as they
would still allow RUK to export considerable amounts of
grain. Some interesting alternative, less market-distorting pol-
icies to export bans were analysed by Liefert et al. (2012).
Their analysis shows that a specific export licensing scheme
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could provide an incentive for producers to first sell at an
autarky level domestically (which would allow domestic con-
sumers to face lower prices) before realizing more profitable
exports (Liefert et al. 2012).
The issue of temporary export restrictions certainly puts
international trade policy into focus, especially regarding
existing WTO rules and the ongoing WTO negotiations with-
in the Doha Development Agenda.WTO disciplines comprise
a rather large grey area that can lead to differing interpretations
of the rules and obligations on export restrictions in the multi-
lateral context (Howse and Josling 2012; Korinek and Bartos
2012). In the light of the analysed effects of RUK export
restrictions on world grain markets it seems necessary to recon-
sider or, at least, strengthen existing WTO rules regarding
temporary export measures. Exporting countries certainly have
a responsibility to provide food security to their own popula-
tion. However, multilateral trade is crucial for many food
insecure countries and therefore some level of cooperation on
the part of exporting countries is needed to avoid importing
countries being denied necessary supplies. Howse and Josling
(2012) and Smith (2012) indicate that the implementation of
new WTO rules might actually not be necessary, but rather a
stricter interpretation of existing WTO disciplines should be
applied. Therefore it might, for example, need multilateral
recognition as to whether a country is indeed facing a food
security crisis that justifies the implementation of temporary
export restrictions (FAO and OECD 2011).
Concluding remarks
This paper assesses the effects of harvest failures and subse-
quent temporary grain export restrictions in RUK on national
and international food security by quantifying their impact on
agricultural market quantities and prices. For the analysis,
AGLINK-COSIMO, a recursive-dynamic, partial equilibrium,
supply–demand model, has been employed. Simulation results
highlighted the importance of RUK’s grain production for
world markets and global food security. A reoccurrence of the
2010 RUK harvest situation in 2015 is projected to cause
increases in world market prices of 23 % for wheat and 15 %
for coarse grains. In the three policy scenarios, the modelled
RUK export restriction measures further aggravate the situation
on world grain markets. However, the impact on the world
market varies significantly, depending on the policy measure
chosen and the level of restriction adopted. The export bans
reflect the most extreme reaction by RUK to harvest failures
and therefore give a good indication on the maximum impacts
on the world market that would occur if there were no grain
exports at all from RUK during one year. Accordingly, export
bans result in the highest increase in world producer prices
(+11 % compared to the benchmark), whereas the modelled
ad valorem export taxes would result in the least effects on the
world cereal markets (+1% price increase) as they would allow
RUK to continue exporting significant amounts.
Regarding the effect of the export restrictions on domestic
grain prices in RUK, scenario results vary not only with respect
to the policy measure implemented, but also with respect to the
country profile. For Russia, a country playing a major role on
the international grains market but where the share of exports in
the national production is projected to be rather low in the
future, strong export restrictions do not prevent sharp price
increases of domestic producers in the scenarios, while effects
on domestic consumer prices are rather limited. In Ukraine and
Kazakhstan, the situation is quite different because both coun-
tries usually export large shares of their overall wheat produc-
tion. While wheat output decreased considerably in Ukraine
and Kazakhstan with the simulated drought, the decreases were
lower than the export levels in the baseline scenario and hence
the two countries continued to export large quantities of wheat
as in the benchmark scenario. Therefore the introduction of an
export ban or a very restrictive export quota in Ukraine (and to a
lesser extend in Kazakhstan) implies that huge additional quan-
tities are kept on the domestic markets. This puts not only
considerable downward pressure on domestic producer prices,
but could (depending on domestic price transmission) poten-
tially result in consumer prices at a level even below a situation
with normal weather conditions and without export restrictions.
By contrast, the simulated level of export tax is much less
disruptive for domestic producer prices, and consumer prices
would be only slightly higher than in the baseline situation. For
coarse grains, simulation results show similar patterns to those
for wheat, but at a generally lower level. The simulation results
also underline the key asymmetry of the impact of limited RUK
grain exports on grain net exporting and net importing coun-
tries. In the example of the EU, we analysed the effects of the
simulated RUK harvest failures and export restrictions on food
security in a major net grain exporting country. Scenario results
showed that although consumers may face somewhat higher
prices, food security in the EU was not generally affected. EU
producers would benefit from increased world prices and the
augmentation of EU wheat exports contributes to a partial
compensation for the lower grain availability on the world
market. However, for coarse grains, EU imports increasedmore
than exports, indicating that the EU is actually adding to the
pressure on the world market.
Our analysis of the effects in Egypt, the major wheat
importing country in theworld, indicated that net grain importing
countries were hit most by RUK export restrictions as the in-
creased prices put considerable pressure on their food security
(although their farmers also benefitted from increased producer
prices). This can be especially problematic for poor net importing
countries as they might not be able to bear the budget burden of
subsidising the basic needs of their populations. Thus, our sce-
nario results highlight that food security needs of third countries,
especially those of net food importing developing countries,
Harvest failures, temporary export restrictions and global food security 739
should to be taken into account more seriously before temporary
export restrictions are implemented. In this respect, a stricter
interpretation of WTO rules and obligations seems to be
necessary. In any case, as pointed out by FAO and OECD
(2011), temporary export bans or very restrictive exportmeasures
should only be implemented as a last resort, if other measures
(such as domestic safety net measures for the poorest) have been
exhausted.
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